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PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
FOR REFUSAL. TO. DEAL
GEORG� J. ALEXANDER*
Refusal to deal with non-complying customers has long been, a '
weapon in the arsenal of manufacturers bent op. establishing sebCmes
which could not be bilaterally created because of the antitrust ia�.l
Actually the weapon is greatly overrated, as many who were still
optimistic about the device found out with the decision of the
Parke-Davis case.2 Some be�eve, in fact, that ·it is entirely a dud.s
At any rate, the countenneasures have grown with recent decisions.
Parke-Davis was merely a reasrtion of the implications of, much
earlier cases4 that the government could attack a scheme al�ough·
it was · technically established through procedure which was more
unilateral than bilateral. A newer threat lies in the potential of a
suit by the customer punished for refusal to comply. This article will
.

�Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University.

1. United States v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) has been generally
interpreted· as sanctioning the action of a single trader, who is not a monop
olist, in demanding customer adherence to a scheme which would violate the
antitrust laws if accomplished by contractual, agreement. The distinction be
tween legal and illegal demands turns on the ability of the single trader to
have his demands characterized as unilaterally imposed rather than having
the resultant conformity characterized as, the product of agreement; since the
applicable' statutes interdict conduct only when it rises to at least a bilateral
level.
2. United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). In a civil suit
instituted by the government, Parke-Davis was charged with violation of § 1
)f the Sherman Act. As part of a price-maintenance scheme, poD had allegedly:
I) discontinued sales to retailers which did not maintain prices, reinstituting
Jealings when the retailers satisfied it that the prices would be maintained;
�) instructed wholesalers, on pain of loss of their supplies, not to deal with
-etailers which were cutting prices; 3) obtained verbal assurance of future
:ompliance with the pricing policy from at least one retailer; and 4) assured
:etailers that compliance with the pricing policy would be required of their
:ompetitors as well as of them. The Supreme Court held the facts to be suRi
:ient to require ,a judgment for the government. Without challenging the right
,f a single trader to announce a price to be maintained and threaten to deal
vith non-conformers, the Court found the enumerated acts to be tantamount
o a combination or conspiracy thus supplying the duality required for a section
verdict. Summarizing its review of previous cases, the' Court stated: "When
he manufacturer's actions . . . go beyond mere announcement of his policy
,nd the simple refusal to deal, and' he employs other means which effect,
'dherence to his resale prices'
,
he has put together a combination in
.
.
iolation of the Sherman Act." !d. at 44.
3 . Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting to Parke-Davis, Ibid., suggests that. the
'pinion has sent the right to refuse to · deal as a means of establishing an
therwise unlawful scheme to its demise.
4. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., �57 U.S. 441 (1922); Unit�d States v.
.
'
ausch and Lomb pptical Co., 321 V.S. 707 (1944).
.

•

•
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survey recent cases dealing with private actions brought by such
customers.

A few years ago the chances of succes of a dealer bringing a
private action because of unilateral refusal to deal with him were
minimal unless he could connect the refusal with -a scheme of mon
opolization.I) The two most common reasons given by the courts for
holding against private plaintiff;:, were: 1) the Jack of duality re
quired under the applicable act6 and 2) the lack of public injury.7
Recent cases do not lend themselves to such simple synthesis.
Some courts, such as the court in Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft
Shop,S appear to decide such cases in much the same way as they
were decided in the past. The complaint, hi that case, alleged that:
the defendants, a manufacturer. of patio furriiture, the manufac
turer's local agent and a retail competitor of the plaintiff, were in
volved ,hi price fixing. The manufacturer had allegedly accepted the
retail price determined by· his agent and the defendant retailer and
had made this the "suggested retail price" for his products. Both
manufacturer and selling agent had then, according to the com
plaint, demanded compliance with the price set and policed such
comp1iance by sending shoppers to stores suspected of discounting.
When discovered selling below the suggested price,
plaintiff had
'
been cut off from further sales.
Dismisg the complaint, the District Court ruled that the ac
tions complained of did not affect interstate commerce arid "that
there was no aHegation of public injury. Furthermore, the court
pointed out, while the agreement between the manufacturer's agent
5. A scheme of monopolization makes section 2 of the Sherman Act appli
cable. Consequently, duality of action is not required and the supplier's conduct
is sufficient to establish plaintiff's case. Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). Plaintiffs relying on unilateral refusal
to deal for failure to maintain prices have, until recently, failed. See Handler,
Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 RECOR.D OP N.Y.C.B.A. 362,
367 (1960) and cases cited. Plaintiffs relying on unilateral refusal to deal for
reasons other than price maintenance have fared no better. See Barber, Refusal
to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 860 (1955)
and cases cited.
6. The duality requirement mar defeat the plaintiff's action in two ways.
It may be found that the entire dIstribution policy of the supplier is unilateral
and, hence. unobjectionable. E.g., Leo J. Meyberg v. Eureka Williams Corp.,
215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954). Alternatively,
it may be found that, while a multilateral distributive scheme may exist,
the supplier's dealings with the plaintiff were unilateral and, hence, unobjec
tionable. E.{!., Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
7. E.g., Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954), cere.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) .
8. 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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and the retailer setting the "suggested" price, if proven, would
establish the requisite duality of action, the later enforcement of that

price by the manufacturer' and his agent was perfectly proper as . a
unilateral refusal to deal.
Of present interest are the court's conclusions relating to the
necesity of public injury and the findiitg of lawful unilateral action
in the statement of retail price coupled with 'the enforcement. pro
gram. The public injury holding, which the opinion traces through
an impressive list of cases, is somewhat peculiar in that no mention
is made of either of the two most recent Supreme Court cases in
point. In Klors Inc. v. Broadway-Hale,s one of the two unmentioned
cases, . the Court found illegality under the antitrust laws to ·be
synonymous with the "public injury" requirement for private actions,
at least in those cases which demonstrated a tendency

toward

case, Radiant Burners Inc. v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co./o appears to settle the "public
injury" requirement more definitely; In a per curiam opinion, the

monopoly. The second unmentioned

Court dealt with the requisite burden of proof in a private action
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act and concluded:
By § 1, Congress has made illegal:

'Every contract, combination

. . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among, the
several States ...' Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.United States,

221

U.S. 1, ... Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the

prohibitions, the courts may not expand them. Therefore, to state C!, claim upon which relief can be granted under that section, aUe- ,
gations adequate to show a violotion and, in a private treble dan'lage
action, that' plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires.ll

Although the case was again one which dealt with a multipartite

decision the effect of which might be similar to the Klors effect, the .
language of the opinion appears unqualified. It would seem that the
"public in jury" test has been read out of priv<I;te antitrust suits by

the Supreme Court only to be reintroduced by Tohman.
Analyzing the duality of action requirement, the court in Tobman
:Juotes at length from the recent Parke-Davis case and concludes that

that opiniol), allows refusals to deal so long as there is no combina
:ion between the partieS� The fact that the price set was enforced
,y shoppers . apparently was considered irrelevant, the courtco!19. 3 59 U.S. 207 (1959).
10. 3 64 U.S. 656 (1961).
11. ld. at 660.

·
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duding that as to the manufacturer's · maintenance 'of price "there
are rio facts· from which the existence of
or
· a contract, Combination.
.
conspiracy, can be inferred."12
. In another case following the sani� approach,18 a similar arrange.

ment was presented not in a complaint but as a defense to an action
for trademark infringement. The House of Dior brought suit against
Alexander's Department Store for misuse of the name "Dior" in
connection with the sale ofa copy of the famous design house's
styles. Among other allegations in the answer, the defendants claimed
that the contracts made by Dior with merchants who were author
ized to use the Dior styles and name violated the antitrust laws of
the United States. Those contracts ·required that the customers, as
a prerequisitie to using the Dior name at all, refrain from using· the
name on any copies which were to be retailed at less than one hun';
dred dollars ,and that they require the same agreement of any cus�
tomer-retailer to whom they might sell. Though the answer contained
an allegation of a. conspiracy by several of the customers and Dior
to eliminate Alexander's as a competitor, this allegation was aban
doned on argument and not considered by the court. Denying that
the answers entitled defendant to summary judgment, the court
...
stated:
·
'

.'

The refusal here to sell unless the required promise is given is a

legitimate, though. perhaps practically unenforceable device for

creating in the mind of the purchasing public an association betWeen

Dior copies and good material, workmanship and seIVice. If retailers
are required to charge

$100

in order to state that what they a�

selling is a Dior copy they will tend to give the quality of material,

workmanship and seIVice for which the public is willing to pay

$100.

The plan does not come within the interdiction of the recent

United States v. Parke Davis. & Co. against refusal

to

sell as a

means of constructing a combination or conspiracy to fix reSale
.
prices.H
'

On the other hand, even before Park�-Davis, the Seventh Circuit
took a different view of similar facts. In A. C. Becken' Co.. v. Gemex
':orp.,lG the plaintiff had been cut off from further supplies because

12. Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop,
194 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Cal.
.
[961).
13. Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cot�)nniere, Etablissements Boussac v.
\lexander's Department Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
14. rd. at 600.
'
15. 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960).
,

_
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it refused defendant's demands to maintain the prices .set by the
defendant for his own products and the prices of defendanes com- .
petitor's brands. The defendant had elicited promises to maintain

both his and his competitor's prices from other retailers who sold.
Gemex products in the plaintif's vicinity and had shaken hands over
it with them. Reversing the District Court's holding th�t the facts
alleged did not state a claim for which relief could be granted,· �e
Court of Appea1s held that the right to refuse to deal was a limited
. right and, without detailing in what respects this arrangement had
transgresed the limits of the right, found the conduct in question.·.
illegal and remanded the case to the District Court solely to ascer
tain damages.

Tobman,16 Alexandersl'l and Gemex18 all deal with a price-fixing

scheme enforced through the seller's refusal to deal with price cut
ters. The facts of Gemex, however, are somewhat different from
those of the other two cases. In Gemex the seller demanded not
only adherence to his own prices, but also adheren�e to the . prices
of his competitors. While· this distinction, once duality of action is
granted, would hardly be necesary since price-fixing itself would be
sufficient to establish a violation of Section 1 of the Shennan Act,!'
it is an aggravating factor"to be considered in' analyzing the allegedly.
unilateral nature of the action. If Parke-Davis stands for the propo
sition that combination may be implied from a scheme of price-fixing
that departs from Doric simplicity, the inclusion of the whole line
of products rather than only the one offered for sale ought to be a
good starting point in finding lack of simplicity. Certainly a manu
facturer could decide that his best interests are served by requiring
adherence to the prices suggested for the whole line of competititive
goods without combining or conspiring. If the retailer is not bound
to adhere to the prices of other manufacturers and if the price
suggested for his own product includes a wider margin of profit than
it otherwise might (as must be asumed to be the usual case in in
stances where retailers balk at charging the price suggested) the net
result of price fixing may be to divert the retailer's efforts to dis
counting competitor's goods with a consequent loss of sales to the
manufacturer. Even this analysis, however, will only explain the
actions of a seller in a market where both he and his competitors
16. Supra note 12.
17. Supra note 13 .
18. A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959);
denied, 3 62 U.S. 962 (1960).
.
19. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
.

.

.

.

ceTt.
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selling at prices in exces of those that would be competitively
established by the defecting sellers. Such a position, in turn, suggests

are

a monopolistic condition in the market, which itself would taint
the refusal to sell. To some extent, of course, the analysis of monopo:

listie position is equally applicable to a single seller's demand that
his own product be sold at a given price.

Alternatively, if Parke-Davis suggests that a combination may be

implied from a series of confertnces with retailers, does not the ad
ditional element of the demr.d for price stability in the entire line
of goods strengthen the inference that a multilateral scheme is being
employed to shore up the price? Is it not less likely that a single
seller, acting only through demands on his customers is able to
manipulate not only his own price but its interrelationship with
the prices of others?

While Gemex presents unique circumstances that might allow it

to take its place beside the other price-maintenance cases, George W.

Warner Co., Inc. v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company,
Inc.20 meets the price-maintenance issue head on. In that case,

plaintiff alleged that he was cut off from supplies after he refused
to withdraw a bid he had made on a New York City Housing

Authority contract. The bid price was below the price set by the
:lefendant for his product and defendant had announced its policy

)f refusal to deal with anyone not maintaining its .price. The District
�ourt, finding that the complaint did not allege that the retailers

lad conspired among themselves or with Black and Decker to main

:ain the price, found the actions of the defendant to be unilateral
md, hence, unimpeachable. The Court of Appeals reversed the Dis

•

rict Court's decision, citing among other cases the Parke-Davis case

.

vhich had been decided between the decision. of the District Court

md the conclusion of the appeal. It found that the complaint

}roiight the case within the doctrines of Beech-Nut21 and Parke

)avis sufficiently to allow trial though it did state, rather ambigu
,usly:

Of course, it will be necessary for plaintiff

to

sustain the alJegations

by the neces�ary proof because it would appear from the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in the Parke, Davis

case

that the

Colgate principles have not been completely dest;royed. The Supreme
Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may

20. 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
21. FTC v. Beech-N.ut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric sim
plicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business
enterprise. . . . The only question presently before the court is
whether the amended complaint is sufficient for that purpose. A
fair reading of the pleadings
such sufficiency . . 22

as

a whole leads to the conclusion of

.

Since the plaintiff had alleged that the scheme complained of wa"
the result of combination and conspiracy, it is not clear what

p�o!,f

the Court of Appeals would require. Defendant did not deny that
he had used threats of refusal to deal as a means of price setting

nor that plaintiff had been cut off from supplies because of his

failure to follow the required price, so apparently neither of those
facts would present considerable proof problems at trial. While the
opinions do not state whether the plaintiff alleged that the other
Black and Decker dealers did maintain the prices as demanded, it
is a fair asumption from the facts given and, at any rate, would not
be difficult to prove at trial. It is also reasonable to assume that the
proof of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and dealers, or
among dealers, need not show a conspiracy expressly aimed at ex
cluding the plaintiff from the trade. Such conspiracy does not seem

to be within the language of the complaint and finding for the
plaintiff on such a reading of the complaint would not require
deciphering the Colgate23 - Parke-Davis line of cases whiCh the opin- .
ion meticulously attempts. Al that appears to remain is a require
ment that plaintif offer some proof that the price-maintenance
scheme was achieved as the result of a concert of action rather than
solely as the result of the statement of policy by the defendant. No
indication is given as to the actual amount of proof required to
allow a finding of implied conspiracy as was found in Parke-Davis.

Despite its lack of definition of the scope of its holding, Black and
Decker seems more in line with the cases instituted by the govern
ment than does either Tobman or Alexanders. In Tobman, the
policing policy seems reminiscent of the enforcement policy which

was found so objectionable in Beech-Nut24 and, for all that when
the court decided the motion, it was aware that there might well
22. George W. Warner Co. v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company,
277 F.2d 787, 790 (2nd Cir. 1960).
23. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
24. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). The court dis
tinguished the scheme in Beech-Nut from permissible refusal to deal primarily
on the efFectiveness of the Beech-Nut policing. Customers were required to
participate in enforcement.

HeinOnline -- 6 St. Louis U. L.J. 495 1960-1961

496

,SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

have been customer cooperation in enforcement as well':oI�, Since, con
spiracy was alleged in both Tobman and Alexanders, it is difficult
to understand why proof might not have brought the schemes within
the interdiction of Parke-Davis. If Radiant Burner;' has equated
private and public actions in regard to the illegality required in each,
Black and Decker would seem to correctly state the law.
Threat of refusal to deal has been used to accomplish aims other,
than price maintenance. One, objective, sometimes accomplished by
, >Dch threat, is tying. A seller may refuse to, sell product A (the
:ying product) for which there, is a good demand unless the buyer
will also buy product B (the tied product) for which the demand
nay not be as great. While such conduct on an economically ad
lanced level runs the risk of being upset by a suit by the govern
nent, until recently the non-complying dealer had little chance of
,
'ecovery in a private suit against his supplier.
,
Once one disposes of the public injury concept, this is another
lrea in which refusal to deal raises interesting problems in di$in
�i�hing between unilateral permissible conduct and bilateral con
luct or conduct which is the equivalent of bilateral conduct. The'
luaJity of action in the tying case is, of course, likely to run between
he manufacturer or wholesaler and the retailer. Unlike the pricing
:ases in which it is usually necessary to obtain the cooperation of a,
lUmber of retailers, tying can be worked,; out on an individual basis.
rhis distinction brings into sharp focus �e need for analysis of the
ransactions between buyer and seller because reference to an im
.lied conspiracy between' the supplier, and his other customers wil
,ot decide the difficult questions. Where the tying pattern is repeti
ive throughout the sales of a given product, however, and the manu
lcturer refuses to sell to anyone not following the pattern, the possi
'ility of the conspiracy analysis of the resale price maintenance
cases
'
: renewed.
IIi Osborn v. Sinclair,2T the Fourth Circuit was faced with an
greement which it analyzed solely in terms of the dealingsl:Jetween
Ie two immediate parties. Sinclair, which had granted a lease to
)sborn for a Sinclair filling station, brought pressure over a period
r years on Osborn to buy greater quantities of tires, batteries and
25. One act of cooperation is alleged in the complaint. The "shopper"
ho discovered plaintiff's deviation was informed to investigate the matter by
.mpeting merchants. '
,
,
26. Radiant Burners Inc. v. Peoples Gas" Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
'

961). .
27. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 ( 4 th Cir. 1960), cert.
'nied,81 S. Ct. 1924 (1961).
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accesories through them. According to the compla4tt, the company's.
representatives .finally threatened not to renew.the lease unles, great
er purchases were made. To retain the, lease for another year, OsbOrn
, complied. When the situation recurred, at the erid of. the next year.
, '
Osborn refused to comply and the lease was cancelled. Finding tha,t '
the original compliance established an illegal tying agrement, the
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismis l of the com-.
plaint. A y.ear earlier, the same court had affirmed the dismis of·a
similar complaint that differed mainIy in the fact ihat the supplier. '
there threatened to cancel a dealership contract (under the 'pro.,
visions of the contract allowing short term cancellation) rather
than refusing to renew an expired contract.28
The court analysis in Osborn does not depend on an implied.
conspiracy by the' manufacturer and other retailers to sell the line'
of PrQductS in question altho�gh the facts might support �ch an
. analysis: The illegal duality found is tbe action between the' de-' ,
fendant and the plaintiff: the' signing of the new lease after plaintiff had succumbed to the demands to buy more TBA products. The
approach leaves a number of questions unanswered. Little light is
shed on the significance of formal lease negotiations as opposed to
a mere statement by the manufacturer that there would be no fur- ,
ther dealings �� more'TBA products were bought. One wonders
how much more is ·involved in such a transaction than surrender, to
a demand made on refusal to deal. The only measure of certainty·
that emerges is that it was neces for the plaintif to agree to
the demands made upon him, for that apparently provided the
requisite duality.
Going even more to fhC1 heart .9f dealership agreements is refi.isa.1
to sell unles the dealer procures the manufacturer's supplies ex, clusively. It is, in fact, in such agreements expres or implied that the'
concept of dealerships and area franchises thrives. Since exclusive .
dealing under circumstances evidencing a substantial adverse eeo-'
nomic effect on interstate commerce also violates the antitrust laws,
this is another area that has seen a shift in treatment given by the'
courts to, buyers who do not wish to comply with the conditionS
imposed on their receipt of, supplieS.
.
In Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,n the Sixth Circuit
.

. 28. McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 3 3 2 .(4th Cir.
• 959). The author has commented. on the Qistinction between the two cases.
Alexander, Full-Line. Forcing of Less Than Requirements b" Threat of Refusal
�o Deal
A. Per Se Violation'?, 12 SYltACUSl!.
L. REv. 175 (1960).
"
29. 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
-
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reversed the District Court's dismis of a complaint which alleged
that the plaintif had lost his dealership because of failure to 'comply
with the demands of the defendant that he use Ford parts almost
exclusively in conducting his authorized Ford repair facility as part
of his general dealership in Ford cars. While the complaint in part

alleged monopolization by the defendant, the court also upheld the
section of the complaint whicr. was based on the allegedly illegal
requirement relating to parts. According to the court, if the condition
requiring the use of Ford parts were proven at trial, all that would
remain to make out a case would be proof that the argement
had the effect of substantially lessening competition.
Englander, as opposed to Osborn, does not seem to lay great stres;
on initial compliance with the demands made by the manufacturer.
It finds the condition one which would be illegal if made bilaterally'
and hence one which may not be imposed by threat 'of refusal to
deal, finding the right to refuse to deal a very limited right.80
The cases commented on above are illustrative of current caSes
concerned with refusal to deal where that device is used to achieve'
a result which would be illegal if accomplished by the joint agree
ment of the parties involved. A .few courts have gone further and
have considered the right of a supplier to refuse to deal with a
customer where such refusal is part of a scheme which would not be
illegal if arrived at in concert with others...
In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,SI the plaintif
complained that his aftion with the Columbia Broadcasting Sys. tem had been cancelled. According to the complaint, CBS was
interested in obtaining a UHF television station in Milwaukee. After
detennining that the plaintif's price for the UHF station which he
was trying to sell was higher than it intended to pay, CBS, through
an ..intennediary, took an option on the other UHF station in Mil
waukee. It subsequently bought the other station and cancelled the
plaintiff's network affiliation in order to asume that affiliation itself.
Since the expensive equipment which plaintiff had bought while he
was a network affiliate was not required in order to operate a purely
local television station, he a.rged a swap of .equipment with the
3 0, The complaint alleged that plaintif's franchise had been canceUed for
non-compliance with·a condition imposed by defen�t by express or implied
agreement with aU customen. No mention was made of plaintifs . previous
to allow
compliatiC,!' Though the opinion is n�t clear ,!n this point, it
about
recovery if 'the resultS of the coerclve practices of defendant
resu1� which would be unreasonable if accomplished by agreement.
3 1. Poner v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d· 599 (D.C,·
Cir. 1960). '
.
.
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defendant and was paid for the difference in value. Claiming
intra-enterprise conspiracy and an attempt to monopolize, plaintif
sought damages. The District Court, on a motion for summary judg
ment, dismisd the complaint and the Court of Appeals affinned,
Judge Washington dissenting. He thought that the plaintiff ought to
be allowed to prove, among other things, that the purchase was an
illegal restraint of trade because it would discourage competition
in the Milwaukee area or in other places. The rationale of that part
of the disent. appears to be that a ,seller may restrain trade by takiBg
over a distributive afate without the action necesrily being an
act of monopolization.
While the dissenting opinion shows concern for a claimant who is
certainly the victim of superior economic' power in the hands of the
defendant, . it is a little difficult to make out a case of restraint of
trade in a situation in which the number of suppliers and their rela
tive positions in the market remain unchanged. The disnting opin
ion concedes that there would have been no restraint of trade if the
station franchise had been granted to some.one else.32 What makes
it potentially restraining, according to the opinion, is that the radio
network itself assumed control. This distinction, while quite appro
priate if monopolization were in isue, is inappropriate to a Section. 1
Sherman Act charge. More likely, the opinion should be taken as an
asrtion that the economic club of refusal to deal may not be used
for grie,:,ances not connected with the .adequacy of representation of
the dealer's product in situations of suc.h disparity of power.
In another interesting case, P. W. Husserl Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern
CO.,33 the plaintiffs complained that after they began suit against
the defendant for other antitrust violations, he refused to deal with
them further. The Court granted a preliminary injunction forbidding
the defendants to refuse to deal with the plaintiffs. The court's
rationale is summarized in one of the paragraphs of the opinion:
In the case at bar the refusal to deal is a bold attempt on the part
. of the defendant Simplicity to deter litigants by economic coercion
from pursuing the lawful remedies granted them by Congres under
the anti-trust laws. Congress envisaged such private suitors as
"allies of the government in enforcing the anti-trust laws". 51
Cong. Rec. 16319 (1914). To pennit private suitors in that posi
tion to. be coerced .�rom pursuing the remedies which Congres

32. Id. at 608 n. 3 (dissenting opinion).
33. 19� F. Supp;.55 (S.D. N.V, 1961).
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gave them would frustrate the public policy which motivated Con:
gress to grant such remedies. It would permit violators .of great
economic strength to rest secure from remedial and punitive action
by private litigants through the exercise of their economic power.
Such a result cannot be tolerated by the courts if the policies .
enunciated by Congress are to be carried out.s,
.
The case is currently being appealed. If the District Court is affirmed
in its conclusion, the opinion will go further than any prior decision'
in limiting the right of refusal to deal as an economic weapon.
From· the facts of the case, it seems clear that to .find an implied
conspiracy by the nonsuing suppliers· is rather nonsensical. If the
non-suing suppliers had actionable claims and did not exercise them
it was certainly not because they' made the decision' as a matter .of
self-interest akin to the self-interest which might motivate them to
adopt a minimum pricing policy. Of even greater significance is the .
fact that even if the agreement in question were made part of the
sales contracts and signed by the sellers, there would be no precedent
for holding the dual conduct to be in restraint of trade. It may
well be that a contract not to sue for damages under these circum
stances would be unenforceable as against public policy but even the
staunchest advocates of expansion of the scope of antitrust have
not yet equated ·an action against public policy with a restraint- of
"
.,
trade.
In considering hiS '�les 'policies today, a manufacturer would cer..
tainly be foolish if 'he were to act under the assumption that the
:mly threat to his refusal to deal lay in suits by the government.
Private litigants have increasingly been succesul in proving that .
the customers may enforce the law in this area. In fact, treble damage
mits may present an even greater financial challenge to the seller
:haJl suit by the government.85 Irrespective of Tobman and a num
xr of earlier cases which interpose the "public injury" requirement
:>etween an illegal act and a private suit by a damaged party, he
:annot rely on immunity on this theory in any instance in which the
:onduct would be found illeg�l in a s�it by the goveriunent.
On the other hand, predictions to the contrary notwithstanding, a
.

34. !d. at 61.
35. The maximum penalty for Sherman Act violations if .fifty thousand'
lollars. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Trebled
lamages in large scale transactions may amount to considerably more. A single
.'aintiff in Leow's Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1954)
,roved damages of one hundred thousand dollars. The trebled amount was,
f course, three hundred thousand dollars.
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, suppiier has ,not been compelled to sell to all wilg buyers to date:
His right to choose customers on a basis rationally connected' to a
policy ,of requiring appropriate representation of his goods,' and
which does' not amount to an illegal combination if contracfually
established with his dealers has also not been attacked. Thus, if a
seller refuses to display the goods properly, uses the goods as a ,means
of attracting customers to competitive items, etc.� it would seem qUite
permissible to threaten, cancellation of business dealings unIes,s th�
situation were remedied. It appears equally unobjectionable for ,the
'manufacturer. or supplier to cancel contractual relations With such
'
dealer either after or without such warning.
Although the Husserl case and the dissenting opinion iri PolleT
seem to suggest that the use of economic coerdon can be equated '
with restraint of trade and then merely judged on the basis of, rea
sonableness, this view Seems unsupported by other decisions. Even
if CoigateS6 had been overruled, actions which do not violate the
substantive provisions of the antitrust laws would still seemingly' be
immune from suit. The lesser qualification of Colgate which has
actually taken place still cannot be read as establishing a new antitrust law capable of supporting private suit.sT
.

,

More difficult are 'the cases dealing with conditions imposed by
refusal to deal where the conditions .would be illegal if contractually
arrived at. Two separate problems are-presented. The first concerns
those arrangements, such as price maintenance, from which the
sellers 'benefit as well as the, manufacturer. While a seller may wish
to retain the benefits of being able to undersell his competitors, he
has much to gain from a general moratorium on price competition.'
Indeed, in many cases, one might suspect that the demand for price
fixing originated with the sellers. In such mutual benefit cases there
is nothing illogical in allowingihe trier of fact to imply a conspiracy
in the acquiescence of the sellers to their supplier's demands. It is
likely that each dealer was informed that the policy to which he was
asked to adhere was also to be required from the other dealers. What
in form might be abject adherence results in an effective method of
horizontal agreement among the dealers. A similar analysis might be

.

'
36. Supra note 23.
. 37. The statutory provision allowing treble damage suits, § 4 of the Clayton
Act, is expressly limited to damage caused by "reason of anything forbidden
.in the antitrust lawl' (emphasis added) 38 STAT. 731, (1914), 15 U.S.C. . § 15"
, (1958). Injunctive relief, granted by § 16 of the Clayton Act, is premised on
"a violation of the antitrust laws," 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §' 26
(1958).
.
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applied to some tying and exclusive dealing arrangements which
result in a greater volume or range of sales by the manufacturer but

also guarantee the dealer an exclusive sales territory or, at least,

more limited competitition in the goods he sells.

If the court will imply a conspiracy to maintain the price of the

product or to divide markets, there is little reason to prevent a suit
by an excluded non-complyin,; prior customer. The agreement

among the dealers, which is hypothecated, surely contains not only
the suggestion that all will comply but also that non-compliers will

no longer be supplied. If this likely provision is also "implied" or,
actually found, the case is even more clearly supportable on' the
theory of price fixing or market sharing but now the additional theory

of the boycott would certainly seem to make itself available though
the courts have not, as yet, adopted the latter rationale.

There remains the question, as yet unanswered, whether a con
spiracy may be or wil be implied in such circumstances. In Gemex,

the court found the arrangement itself sufficient. In the' Black and

Decker case, on the other hand, the opinion suggested that more

remained to be proven. At a minimum, one would think' that the

manufacturer could still prove that the scheme was purely unilat
erally imposed without either active participation or wil�ng ac

quiescence by his customers. Beyond that, since the conduct is"
after all, illegal when it is the result of joint., action, the manufac
turer would be well advised that his position is most tenuous.
The second problem arises in those

cases

in which a conspiracy,

cannot reasonably be implied, as in a great, number of tying cases.
Osborn and Englander suggest that the acceptance of the condition
itself by the dealer constitutes the duality required to bring the case

within the scope of the appropriate portions of the antitrust law.
Finding duality in compliance with the demands of the manu

facturer would, of course, simplify the price-maintenance cases
greatly. It would effectively overrule the Colgate doctrine a�d make

the implied conspiracy doctrine discussed earlier unnecessary. There
is little indication, however, of transferrence of the rationale to the

pricing cases. Perhaps the nature of the restraints imposed suggests
the reasons for a stricter interpretation in the cases which concern

demands by the manufacturer to take larger quantities of his goods.

In the pricing cases, the manufacturer relinquishes his goods before

his condition is met. His condition is imposed not on the trans
action then occurring

but on future transactions.

If the dealer

chooses to cut ,prices, he may still do so; albeit at the risk of losing
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future supplies. Furthermore, if dealers are inclined to bolt from the'
suggested priceS, the manufacturer may· be forced to establish a
sufficiently complex enforcement scheme to move himseH away from
his immune position as a single trader. In the tying and exclusive
dealing cases, however, once the orders are placed the manufacturer
.
has achieved everything that he demanded: the dealer has bought
the tied product or taken his requirements of supplies from him.
Unfortunately, this line of analysis seems to require acceptance of

the condition at least once in order to' establiSh the illegal duality.,
A subsequent cancellation of dealings when the dealer fails to renew
the offending arrangement seems, however, to be within the scope
of the damages arising from the initial demand.ss
The apparent trend toward incapacitating demands for illegal
schemes made on refusal to deal with non-compliers should not be
viewed with too great alarm. To be 'sure, the right to choose o�e's ,
customers is an impOJ:tant segment of a free economy and ·sho�ld be.
left intact to the extent possible. For just that reason, even economic
disparity between the parties should not prohibit the use of refusal
to deal to gain economic advantage or to terminate dealings with
customers who have become offensive ·for one reason or another ...If
an answer is to be supplied for cases such as Poller and Husserl it
should come from an attempt to deal with the inherent inequities
in the situation itself. In both cases, sonie legislation is currently
applicable.89 Whether the legislation is adequate should not be de
cided under the guise of antitrust action. Economic disparity may
itself lead 'to antitrust violation when it rises to the monopolization
level.40 Short of that, the underlying rationale seems to' favor com
petition as a regulator. A right to buy, as such, is elemental to a
regulated economy but inimical to the prevailing system.
Allowing private litigants to bring suit against suppliers on much
.
the same evidence which would justify a governmental claim does
not change the substantive law of refusal to deal. A given scheme is

38. In Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558(1951)
the Supreme Court held that, having etsablished a conspiracy to force General
Motors dealers to use GMAC, "it therefore was necessary for petitioners only
to introduce
evidence of the impact of the conspiracy on them, such as
cancellation of their franchises and the purpose of General Motors in cancelling
them, and evidence of any resulting damages." Id. at 571.
39. The CBS power is limited by FCC regulation. In fact, acquisition of a
UHF station was held up pending the adoption by the FCC of the 5·2 rule
which allowed networks to acquire up to 2 UHF stations. In HUSSlrl, the plain
tiff was bringing suit based on a statute designed in part to overcome his
economic inequality vis a vis his supplier: the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT.
1526(l936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(1958).
'40. �astman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials Co 273 U.S. 359 '(1927).
.

.

•

.•
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stil either innocent or illegal. It does,however, suggest the likelihood

of a much' greater level. of enforcement than would otherwise be
possible. A customer who has had his dealings with his supplier terminated has little reason for not suing.·The government in.iis enforce-·
ment program must, of necessity, choose among many pptentially
offending dealers since it lacks the resources to investigate and prose�
cute all firms against which complaints are lodged.
,
,In the price. ma.hltenance cases, this wil mean that most of the
plans in current operation which do not fal within the framework
of fair trade laws may be tested in court. Since price, fixing is one of
the per se offenses, 41 the plaintiff wil merely have to prove the
"implied conspiracy" and his own damages. If such comparative ease
of proof means that it wil no longer be feasible to use refusill to
deal to set retail prices,there seems little reason· to regret the results..
In those states which feel that legitimate ends are servt;d by retail
price fixing,the fair trade laws allow a. great measure of latitude.fa
In the other states, where either the legislature48 or the COUrts44 have .
found fair trading not to be in the public interest, the justification
for pricing based on refusal to deal is slight.
. In the cases where the supplier demands purchase of a. line of
goods or exclusive dealing,the results will not be as dramatic. Neither
offense is illegal per se.45 T�us,the dealer must prove not only the
scheme,his sometime adherence (to esta,blish the requisite duality).
or a conspiracy, but also that the effect of the plan has the requisite
adverse affect on commerce.4S In considering the effect on commerce,
the courts will be free to exonerate the suppliers whose ' programs are
,

justifiable because of economic necesity.
A supplier will still be free to choose his customers with an eye to
his own economic welfare. If the customer does not as in the pro
�otion of the product being sold, he may be left without further
supplies. In his right to refuse to deal, the supplier maintains the
power to command competition for his product among retailers and
thereby to command proper facilities and services in the sale of his
41.
42.
REP.
43.
44.

United States v. Trenton Potteries 'Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) .
The provisions of state acts are summarized at 11 3003-3008 TRADE REO.

Only five states do not have legislative provisions concerning fair trade.
A number of state courts have declared fair trade laws unconstitutional.
E.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White, 275 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1955) ;
a chart of state rulings concerning' the constitutionality of 'fair trade laws is
presented at 113003 TRADE REG. REP.
45. FTC v. Sinclair Refining, 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (tying); Tampa Electric
.,
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (exclusive dealing) .
46. Englande,r Moton, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959) .
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product. Use of 'refusal to deal for such ptirposes is in accord with the
philosophy of a free econoQ'ly. Absent an offensive condition on . ·
continued dealing, a supplier should feel safe in choosing his customers. The courts wil not likely force him to change his policies either
at the behest of the government or of a private suitor.
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